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Abstract. The most common wireless Medium Access Control (MAC) protocol 
is IEEE 802.11. Currently IEEE 802.11 standard protocol is not resilient for 
many identified MAC layer attacks, because the protocol is designed without 
intention for providing security and with the assumption that all the nodes in the 
wireless network adhere to the protocol. However, nodes may purposefully 
show misbehaviours at the MAC layer in order to obtain extra bandwidth con-
serve resources and degrade or disrupt the network performance. This research 
proposes a secure MAC protocol for MAC layer which has integrated with a 
novel misbehaviour detection and avoidance mechanism for Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks (MANETs). The proposed secure MAC protocol the sender and re-
ceiver work collaboratively together to handshakes prior to deciding the back-
off values. Common neighbours of the sender and receiver contributes effec-
tively to misbehaviours detection and avoidance process at MAC layer. In addi-
tion the proposed solution introduces a new trust distribution model in the net-
work by assuming none of the wireless nodes need to trust each other. The se-
cure MAC protocol also assumes that misbehaving nodes have significant lev-
els of intelligence to avoid the detection.   
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1 Introduction  
Computer network security is one of the most important elements in computer sys-
tems. Wireless networks have been widely used in banking, military, medical and in 
many other sectors [3]. Wireless network security is becoming increasingly important 
due to the dramatic enhancement of the wireless devices (e.g. PCs, tablets, mobile 
phones). There are two types of wireless networks, infrastructure based networks 
(WLANs) and wireless Mobile Ad-hoc Networks. Infrastructure based networks are 
controlled by a centralized base station which is the receiver of the network for all the 
connected nodes [4]. In contrast MANETs are self-organized, dynamically changing 
the topology without a centralized base station. Wireless nodes in the MANETs 
communicate by forwarding packets on behalf of each other by working as router. 
 MANET is an autonomous collection of mobile nodes that communicate over the 
bandwidth constrained wireless network environment [10] [8]. MANETs need to 
contain the basic security requirements such as availability, fairness, authorisation, 
data confidentiality and data integrity [6]. MAC layer nodes misbehaviour has been a 
  
 
problematic scenario for MANETs and infrastructure based networks. Some selfish 
mobile stations do not follow the IEEE 802.11 protocol rules in sharing medium. 
IEEE 802.11 protocol assumes nodes in the wireless network fully cooperate to the 
protocol [10]. However, due to vast enhancement of the programmability of network 
devices, changing these MAC layer protocol parameters has become easier. Distribut-
ed Coordinates Function (DCF) uses the Binary Exponential Back-off (BEB) mecha-
nism to assign back-off for wireless stations, but unfortunately due to vulnerability, 
this mechanism can be exploited easily. Rest of this paper organized as research 
background in the next section. Next sections organized as, the proposed secure MAC 
protocol design and the conclusion. 
 
2 Research Background 
 
The research motivates to provide solutions for following MAC layer selfish misbe-
haviours. 
 Back-off value Manipulation: In 802.11 MAC protocol selfish nodes use smaller 
back-off values than they should and also use fixed back-off values instead of ran-
dom values. Back-off value Manipulation also includes nodes doesn’t double the 
congestion window size after a collision.   
 Adaptive Cheating / Adaptive Misbehaviour: Some nodes are smart to adapt 
their misbehaviour strategy to prevent them from being caught by regular detection 
methods. Intelligent nodes are aware of the detection scheme and adapt to mislead 
the detection.     
 Colluding Nodes: Sender and receiver can negotiate to misbehave as a pair, in   
schemes that trusts the sender or receiver or both [6]. Detection of such misbehav-
iours can be complicated. 
 MAC layer misbehaviours have been studied from different perspectives using dif-
ferent methodologies. Many researches have focused on solving the MAC layer mis-
behaviour problems by modifying the existing IEEE 802.11 protocol [1] [2]. These 
procedures include changing the Binary Exponential Back-off (BEB) algorithm, 
properties of the CSMA/CA control packets and the authority of back-off value allo-
cation to the receiver [4]. In contrast, statistical inference based detection techniques 
do not modifying the underlying protocol architecture. Instead these techniques gather 
the protocol transaction data to analyse misbehaviour [8].   
Research done in [4] [5] has identified out many problems, such as receiver 
misbehaviour, colluding nodes and adaptive misbehaviour. In their approach [4] the 
receiver assigns back-off value to the sender and monitors the sender’s behaviours. 
The research carried out by Radosavac et al. in [6] presented their work based on the 
previous study in [4]. Their protocol has addressed the major drawback in previous 
proposal in [4] which was assumed the receiver is trusted. Their approach [6] was that 
sender and receiver agrees through a public discussion on random back-off value. 
Protocol always ensures that honest party agreed value is truly random. But it is as-
sumed in [6] that one of the parties has to be trustworthy and the honest receiver can 
monitor the behaviour of the sender and identify the deviation [6]. However, this ap-
proach failed to detect colluding nodes. Smart selfish misbehaviour detection method 
has presented in [9] with a predictable random back off algorithm that can mitigates 
the effect of the smart MAC layer misbehaviour. Research done by Rong et al. in [8] 
have explained how statistical and probability models can be utilized to detect cheat-
ing stations. This approach has used Bianchi Stochastic Model to build a probability 
distribution model for packet inter-arrival times.     
3 Proposed Secure MAC Protocol and Detection Mechanism 
This project aims to propose a secure MAC protocol design, which can be in-
tegrated with a novel MAC layer misbehaviour detection and avoidance mechanism. 
Secure MAC protocol is a novel approach as firstly, the sender and receiver hand-
shake prior to deciding the back-off value but the receiver has the authority to decide 
the final value. This negotiation requires a mechanism to stop each sender and receiv-
er from generating small back-off values. The secure MAC protocol consists of a 
statistical analyser as a first line of defence to detect generation of small back-off 
values. Secondly, secure MAC protocol effectively uses common neighbours to detect 
misbehaviours at the MAC layer. Common neighbours (CNs) actively work with the 
sender and receiver in the process of monitoring, detecting and penalizing. In addition 
the mechanism introduces a new trust distribution in the network by assuming none of 
the wireless nodes need to trust any other. This trust model is a process of involving 
CNs to construct a trust distribution to the network. This research also assumes that 
misbehaving nodes are having significant levels of intelligence to avoid the detection. 
This research addresses sender misbehaviour, receiver misbehaviour and also collud-
ing node misbehaviour. 
 
Fig. 1. Secure MAC Protocol and Detection Framework 
 
Fig. 1 demonstrates the proposed Secure MAC protocol. Firstly, the main detection 
component does all the analysis of network traffic and manipulation of CNs data. 
This main module communicates with other components such as penalty scheme, 
diagnosis scheme and secure MAC protocol message exchange. This component con-
  
 
tains the trust model and statistical data analyser which act as the lowest level of de-
tection technique. Secondly, penalty scheme is the module that assigns penalties for 
deviating senders in each transmission. The third component is diagnosis module 
which performs the detection operation based on the data received by the main detec-
tion component, penalty scheme and Trust model.    
 
3.1 Common Neighbours (CNs) and Trust Model 
Wireless nodes in the transmission range of both sender and receiver are considered 
as CNs. The main rational behind using CNs is to build a trust model for the network, 
monitoring and reporting on node behaviour. For example in Fig. 2, nodes 2, 3, 6, and 
8 are CNs of nodes 5 and 7. CNs monitoring eliminates most of the unwanted com-
munication overhead. CNs keeps records of the transactions of different sender re-
ceiver pairs for a period of time. Table 1contains all the transmission details recorded 
in a neighbour node (node 3 in Fig. 2) such as communication ID, expected back-off 
value (BOV), average sender access times and deviation factor. 
According to the Table 1, there are communication entries that were recorded from 
multiple sender receiver pairs. Ex: Node 3 records communications between sender 
receiver pairs such as (5-7), (8-7) and (5-3). In Fig. 2 wireless node 3 records all the 
transactions of sender receiver pairs of which node 3 is a CN. 
 
Fig. 2. Distributed Cooperate Detection Mechanism Common Neighbours 
 
Communication ID Expected BOV Deviation Factor    ) Sender Access 
5          7 5 4 5 
8          7 10 4 7 
5          3 11 10 10 
Table 1. Node 3 records during the transmission period 
Trust model is the process in which each wireless node builds trust among each 
other. This trust model assumes that no one has to trust anybody but trustworthiness 
gradually changes when nodes start to follow the protocol. The trust model is de-
signed in such way that if a node collaborates to detect adversary nodes (observing 
and reporting) then the node is able to maintain a fair share. Deviation factor repre-
sents the selfishness of the given transmission. If the transmission fails to adhere to 
the expected back-off value then the deviation factor will be increased by 1 if not it 
will be decreased by 1. The following equation (Eq. 1) calculates trust value based on 
data from Table: 1. Node 5 appears twice in the Table: 1, let’s define that as “n” 
deviation factors ( ) of each of these appearances.  The maximum value of ( ) is 10 
so each value divided by 10 to get a probability for the node deviation. Table: 2 also 
maintain the nodes status in the network which has defined as normal state (NML) 
and misbehaving state (MSB).  
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Table 2. Common Neighbour (node 3) Trust value table 
3.2 Secure MAC Protocol Message Exchange 
The standard IEEE 802.11 protocol message exchange has been modified and re-
designed as a security embedded protocol. Provided that DCF control packets such as 
RTS, CTS, DATA, and ACK been modified to add more data fields. The major inspi-
ration behind modifying the protocol is to change the operation of back-off value 
calculation and allocation authority, while allowing CNs to be involved in the proto-
col operations.     
3.3 Penalty Scheme (Misbehaviour Avoidance) and Voting Policy(VP) 
Penalty scheme is important to discourage wireless node misbehaviours and forces 
adversary nodes to follow the standard protocol once they have violated it. A penalty 
value needs to be assigned whenever a node deviates from the protocol. In this pro-
posed protocol, receiver assigns the penalty value to the sender. Voting Policy (VP) is 
introduced to the penalty scheme to detect colluding neighbours and also to minimize 
misdiagnosis. VP operates at the receiver end by broadcasting a request to obtain the 
trust value of the relevant sender in each CN. If sender expected back-off value 
(B_exp) and the actual back-off value observed by receiver and CNs is B_exp. Fol-
lowing equation (Eq. 2) calculates the penalty value of node id "i". The variable α is a 
value (0…1) that minimizes the hidden terminal effect in monitoring actual back-off 
values by the receivers and CNs. Numbers of CNs are defined by "N” and TRV is the 
trust value of nodes that appear in Table.1. Then the receiver calculates new back-off 
value by adding penalty to the next transmission.   
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3.4 Diagnosis Mechanism 
 
In this research there are two levels of detection to avoid selfish misbehaviours 
at MAC Layer. Firstly, detection at random numbers generation level. This is a statis-
tical inference detection approach to prevent the nodes to generate small back-off 
values out of well-known function's distribution. If a node generates such back-off 
Node Id Trust Value (%) Status 
8 50 NML 
5 70 MSB 
  
 
values, then there is a high probability that statistical detection module will name this 
node as a misbehaving node or increase node’s deviation factor. Secondly, detection 
based on CNs’s behaviour monitoring and trust model. After a certain time period and 
certain number of transmissions the trust values must have saved for each node at 
each CN, CNs then report their recorded trust values to the diagnosis module for the 
decision. Diagnosis mechanism calculates the average trust value and makes a deci-
sion of node’s behaviours.     
 
4 Conclusion 
This research has proposed a novel design for a secure MAC layer protocol which 
is aimed to be resilient for MAC layer misbehaviours. The proposed protocol also 
assumes that wireless nodes can follow some adaptive misbehaviour strategies to 
avoid the detection. This research has proposed a novel detection approach which 
includes the CNs monitoring, trust model and penalty scheme and diagnosis scheme. 
In the future work, performance of the proposed protocol will be evaluated using ns2 
network simulation. 
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